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Abstract:  Quantum mechanics led to spectacular technological developments, discovery of 
new constituents of matter and new materials: however there is still no consensus on its 
interpretation and limitations.  Some scientists and scientific writers promote some exotic 
interpretations and evoke quantum magic. In this paper we point out that magical explanations 
mean the end of the science.   Magical explanations are misleading and counterproductive.  We 
explain how a simple probabilistic locally causal model   is able to reproduce quantum 
correlations in Bell tests. We also discuss difficulties of mathematical modelling of the physical 
reality and dangers of incorrect mental images. We examine in detail when and how a 
probabilistic model may describe completely a random experiment.  We give some arguments in 
favor of contextual statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics.  We conclude that we still 
don’t know whether the quantum theory provides a complete description of physical phenomena 
and we explain how it may be tested. We also point out that there remain several open questions 
and challenges which we discuss in some detail.  In particular there is still no consensus about 
how to reconcile quantum theory with general relativity and cosmology.  
Keywords:  Statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics and problem of completeness,,  
EPR-Bohm paradox, Bell-type inequalities and quantum non-locality, locally causal explanation 
of quantum correlations, testing predictable completeness of quantum mechanics, problems 
with a description of physical reality: abstract models  and  incorrect mental images, quantum 
magic, successes and challenges of quantum theory, semi-empirical models and free 
parameters,  infinities in quantum field theory and renormalization procedures. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum mechanics (QM) is extremely successful theory. Since it uses abstract 
mathematical language several physicists, philosophers and scientific writers add to it 
interpretations which are sometimes pure science fiction and general public is highly confused. 
On Wikipedia one may find more than 18 interpretations of QM.  In our opinion many of these 
interpretations add only to the confusion.  
We adopt minimalistic statistical contextual interpretation (SCI) which combines in some 
sense statistical interpretations of Einstein [1, 2], and Ballentine [3, 4] with Copenhagen 
interpretation (CI) promoted by Bohr [5].  In this interpretation [6-14] a quantum state is not an 
attribute of a single physical system which can be changed instantaneously but it describes 
statistical properties of an ensemble of similarly prepared systems. Quantum states, which are 
mathematical entities, together with Hermitian operators representing measurements of various 
physical observables, in well-defined experimental contexts, allow making objective probabilistic 
predictions on a statistical scatter of measurement outcomes. SCI and CI do not provide any 
detailed space-time description of quantum phenomena.  
In SCI and in CI a wave function of the universe is simply a non-sense. According to SCI and 
CI it is a non-sense to say that an electron may be at the same time here and a meter away or to 
compare entangled pair of photons to two perfectly random dice that always give the correct 
matching outcomes.  
All quantum paradoxes are based on incorrect images of quantum phenomena and/or on 
incorrect interpretation of a quantum state vector (wave function). SCI agrees with Einstein [1] : 
…Ψ function does not, in any sense, describe the state of one single physical system..” and with 
Ballantine [4]: ”…the habit of considering an individual particle to have its own wave function is 
hard to break.... though it has been demonstrated strictly incorrect”.  Reduced wave functions 
describe different sub-ensembles of physical systems 
In SCI it is justified to ask whether more detailed locally causal description of quantum 
phenomena is possible. According to SCI one may not even take for granted that QM is 
predictably complete (complete from a predictability point of view).  Therefore one should carefully 
check whether quantum probabilities grasp all reproducible properties of experimental time-
series.  
 John Bell [15, 16] demonstrated that some probabilistic local realistic hidden variables 
probabilistic models (LRHV) are unable to reproduce all quantum predictions for spin 
polarization correlation experiments (SPCE). Namely he proved some inequalities for spin 
correlations which could not be violated by the correlations deduced using LRHV but which 
should be violated, for some experimental setting, by the correlations predicted by QM.  Several 
other Bell-type inequalities were proven and tested in carefully designed experiments.  
Experiments [16-21] confirmed the predictions of QM and the violation of inequalities. 
Several physicists concluded that no rational causally local explanation of these long range 
quantum correlations might be given.  Therefore it seems that either correlations are created due 
to the quantum magic and come from out of the space-time or we are living in a correlated super-
deterministic universe and the experimentalists’ freedom to choose their experimental settings is 
an illusion.  
Nevertheless rational explanation of violation of Bell- type inequalities has been given since 
many years ago, often independently, by several authors [6-11, 22-60]. Several computer 
simulations were able to reproduce quantum predictions [61-68]. A recent review may be found 
in {33, 40, 41, 51-52}.  In spite of this a belief in in the existence of nonlocal instantaneous 
influences has not been fading and it nourishes the hope that a scalable superfast quantum 
computer using these influences may be constructed. 
There is nothing magical in the violation of Bell -type inequalities. The probabilistic models 
used to prove inequalities are not general enough and they are inconsistent with the 
experimental protocols used in SPCE [51]. If supplementary parameters describing measuring 
instruments are correctly incorporated in local probabilistic models than inequalities may not be 
proven [38, 51, 52, 56, 57] .  Similarly if one does not assume that all experimental outcomes are 
predetermined and measuring instruments register passively these outcomes then all non-
probabilistic proofs of these inequalities are also not valid [8].  
One may find in serious scientific papers statements that Nature is nonlocal, that when three 
quantum particles are put in two boxes yet no two particles are in the same box etc.  Quantum 
magic is promoted in several blogs, videos on YouTube, in BBC awarded documentary entitled: 
“Where that could be identical copies of you?” etc. One might say that magic sells better! 
The aim of this paper is to point out that if we abandon searching for rational explanation of 
physical phenomena and if we evoke magic then the science will become a science fiction.  
Therefore people working on the quantum computer project or trying to reconcile general 
relativity with QM have to be aware that rational explanations of quantum correlations do exist. 
They should also know that the Bohr-Einstein quantum debate about the completeness of 
quantum mechanics may not be closed [52].  
We know now that QM does not give a complete description of physical systems since we 
need quantum electrodynamics, quantum field theory and the standard model. The Bohr-
Einstein quantum debate is about how we are modelling physical reality and in what sense a 
statistical description of phenomena may be considered complete  
Einstein agreed that it is impossible to measure simultaneously a position and a linear 
momentum of an electron with an arbitrary precision but believed that a complete theory should 
not abandon a space-time description of its invisible motion. Bohr pointed out that space-time 
lost its empirical foundation at the atomic scale and only abstract mathematical description 
provided by QM may be used to explain quantum phenomena. .  
In 2002 we wrote a paper on the completeness of quantum mechanics [46]. Some parts of this 
paper were extended and published later. It still contains some unpublished material which we 
include after some editing in this article.  It discusses the difficulties of mathematical modelling 
of physical reality and it gives some insight how one may understand and test the completeness 
of statistical description of phenomena. In particular we point out that we do not even know 
whether QM is predictably complete and that it should be tested.  
We are not alone to be preoccupied with the present situation.  Let us quote here for 
example Schlosshauer, Kofler and Zeilinger  [69] who analyzed the results of a poll carried out in 
2013 among 33 participants of a conference on the foundations of quantum mechanics:                   
“Quantum theory is based on a clear mathematical apparatus, has enormous significance for the 
natural sciences, enjoys phenomenal predictive success, and plays a critical role in modern 
technological developments. Yet, nearly 90 years after the theory’s development, there is still no 
consensus in the scientific community regarding the interpretation of the theory’s foundational 
building blocks. Our poll is an urgent reminder of this peculiar situation.”  
Already Richard Feynman said: ”Nobody understands quantum mechanics”. If we continue 
to use incorrect mental images and imprecise terminology we will never do. 
The paper is structured as follows.  
In Section 2 we talk about modelling of the physical reality and about the origin of Bell 
inequalities. 
In Section 3 we explain on an example of a simple locally causal probabilistic model why 
Bell type inequalities may not be proven and QM predictions may be reproduced  
In Section 4 we discuss what it means that a probabilistic model gives a complete description 
of a random experiment and how it may be tested. 
Section 5 contains a discussion of some open questions and challenges. 
2. Modelling of the physical reality. 
In this section we reproduce after some editing several paragraphs form [46]. 
Let us imagine that we are sitting on a shore of an island on a lake watching a sunset. We see 
bird’s flying, leaves and branches are moving with a wind, a passage of a boat produces all 
interesting patterns on the surface of the lake and we hear regular waves hitting the shore. 
Finally a big round circle of the sun is hiding under the horizon leaving a place for beautifully 
illuminated clouds and later for planets and stars. All these physical phenomena are perceived by 
us in three dimensions and they are changing in time usually in an irreversible way.  
To do physics we have to construct mathematical models leading to predictions concerning 
our observations and measurements. This is why we created concepts of material points, waves 
and fields. For Newton light was a stream of small particles. For Maxwell light was an 
electromagnetic wave moving in a continuous invisible medium called ether, similarly to waves 
on a water. With the abandon of ether in special theory of relativity we lost the intuitive image   
of the propagation of light.  
A discovery of the fact that exchanges of energy and of linear momentum between light and 
matter are quantized gave a temptation to represent again light as a stream of indivisible              
(point-like) photons moving rectilinearly and being deflected only on material obstacles or 
absorbed and emitted by atoms. This picture together with the assumption that each indivisible 
photon may pass only by one slit or another and that the interaction with a slit through which it 
is passing does not depend on the fact that  other slit is open or closed is clearly inconsistent with 
the observed interference pattern. Photons are not localizable objects but similar interference 
phenomena may be observed with electrons, with C-60 molecules [70] etc.    
We discovered that the light and the matter may present wave or corpuscular behavior in 
mutually exclusive (complementary) experimental arrangements.  It is clear that we cannot 
model a light source as a gun and photons as bullets.  Similarly if we observe a passage of a boat 
on a lake we can detect and even measure the energy and the momentum transferred by regular 
waves hitting a buoy close to a shore. We could even think that we observe a beam of ”wavelons” 
hitting the buoy close to a shore. However there is no comparable transfer of energy and 
momentum on any buoy, floating in deep water, away from a shore.  Therefore we cannot make 
an image of the boat producing a beam of “wavelons”. Of course we can see changes on the 
surface of the lake but in quantum physics we do not see the” lake”. This example shows a 
danger of image making. Wrong images lead to paradoxes and to wrong deductions. 
There is wholeness in quantum experiments.  The only picture given by QM is a black box 
picture. As an input we have an initial “beam” of physical systems entering a box as an output 
we have a modified” beam” ( ”beams”) or a set of counts on various detectors.  QM does not give 
any intuitive detailed picture of what is happening in the box. Let us cite Bohr [5]:”Strictly 
speaking, the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics and electrodynamics merely offers 
rules of calculation for the deduction of expectations pertaining to observations obtained under 
well-defined experimental conditions specified by classical physical concepts”.  
This statement is valid not only for the description of many standard atomic phenomena but 
also for  S- matrix description of all scattering processes of elementary particles and for stochastic 
models describing the time evolution of trapped molecules, atoms or ions. The quantum 
mechanics and new stochastic approaches have no deterministic prediction for a single 
measurement or for a single time -series of events observed for a trapped ultra-cold atom. The 
predictions being of statistical or of stochastic character apply to the statistical distribution of 
results obtained in long runs or in several repetitions of the experiment.  
 A classical mechanics also concentrates on the quantitative description of observations.. The 
Sun and the Earth are represented mathematically by material points characterized at each 
moment of time by their masses, positions and velocities. If in some inertial frame initial 
positions and velocities are known Newton’s equations allow determining a subsequent motion 
of these points which agrees remarkably well with the real motion of the Earth around the Sun. 
There is no speculation by what mechanism a change in the position of one body causes an 
instantaneous change in the acceleration of another body but it does not harm the success of the 
model. Of course a quest for a more detailed understanding of the mutual interactions between 
distant masses led to the progress in physics namely to the development of classical 
electrodynamics and to the creation of the general theory of relativity. 
 In spite of the fact that QM gives often only statistical predictions on outcomes of various 
experiments a claim is made that QM gives a complete description of the physical phenomena 
and even the most complete description of individual physical systems.  Einstein has never 
accepted this claim and his famous paper written with Rosen and Podolsky [71] started the 
discussions on the interpretation and completeness of QM.  These discussions continue till now.  
In the statistical interpretation [4], inspired by Einstein, a wave function describes only an 
ensemble of identically prepared physical systems and the reduction of wave function is a 
passage from the description of the whole ensemble of these systems to the description of a sub-
ensemble satisfying some additional conditions. The statistical interpretation is free of paradoxes 
because a single measurement does not produce the instantaneous reduction of the wave 
function. The statistical interpretation leaves a place for the introduction of supplementary 
parameters (called often hidden variables) which would determine the behavior of each 
individual physical system during the experiment. Several theories with supplementary 
parameters (TSP) have been discussed [15]. 
 QM gives predictions for spin polarization correlation experiments (SPCE) dealing with 
pairs of electrons or photons produced in a singlet state. In order to explain these long range 
correlations Bell analyzed a large family of TSP so called local or realistic hidden variable theories 
(LRHV) and showed that their predictions must violate quantum mechanical predictions for 
some configurations of the experimental set-up.  Bell’s argument was tested in several 
experiments and confirmed the predictions of quantum mechanics.  
Many physicists conclude that if a TSP wants to explain experimental data it must allow for 
faster than light influences between particles and thus violate Einstein’s locality. Even without 
deep reasoning one can see that this conclusion must be flawed. Let us imagine a huge volcanic 
eruption taking place somewhere in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. Tsunami waves hitting the 
shores of Japan and America will be correlated in a natural way. Long range correlations usually 
are due to a common cause and come from the memory of past events and time evolution. They 
do not require superluminal influences between distant objects.  
It was shown by many authors that the assumptions made in LRHV are more restrictive, 
that they seemed to be, and that Bell’s inequalities may be violated not only by quantum 
experiments but also by macroscopic ones. Here we stop this s edited long citation from [46]. 
Since 2002 the violation of Bell-type inequalities has been confirmed in several experiments 
[18-21] and has been explained in a rational way in several books and articles. Nevertheless, as 
we mentioned in the introduction many authors still incorrectly believe that one has to abandon 
the locality of Nature or experimenters’ freedom of choice. In a recent paper it was clearly 
explained why such beliefs are unfounded [52]. In the next section we recall a simple causally 
local contextual probabilistic model for twin photon beam SPCE which is able to reproduce 
predictions of QM and does not allow proving any Bell -type inequality.  
3. A local and causal model explaining quantum correlations 
In twin photon beam SPCE experiments a source is emitting two correlated signals arriving 
to distant polarization beam splitters (PBS) and detectors. The signals produce clicks on the 
detectors and the correlations between the clicks registered by Alice and Bob are estimated for 
different settings of their PBS.   
In spite of what was claimed one may construct a simple locally causal probabilistic model 
reproducing these correlations [52]. It must include some additional parameters (contextual 
hidden variables) which describe signals, PBS and detectors at the moment of their interaction. 
Clicks or their absence for a given setting (x, y) are determined in a causal and local way in 
function of correlated parameters (λ1, λ2) describing signals and uncorrelated parameters (λx, λy) 
describing measuring devices at the moment of a ``measurement``. We assume also that we are 
not living in super-deterministic universe and that experimentalists may choose experimental 
settings (x, y) as they wish:  randomly or in a systematic way.  In our model it does not matter.  
The choice of (x, y) does not depend on (λ1, λ2) describing incoming signals. 
Simple probabilistic model incorporating contextual hidden variables allows reproducing 
the long range correlations between clicks observed by Alice and Bob in different settings [52, 53]: 
 
                                          (1)                             
where  Λxy= Λ1 x Λ2 x Λx x Λy   , Ax(λ1,λx ) and  By(λ2,λy )  are equal  0, ±1 .  Random experiments 
performed in different settings are described using different parameter spaces Λxy  in agreement 
with QM and with Kolmogorov theory of probability [10, 34, 45, 51].  The oversimplification 
made by Bell was the assumption that Λxy= Λ =Λ1 x Λ2 what is equivalent to assuming that the 
correlations in different incompatible experiments may be deduced from a joint probability 
distribution on some unique probability space Λ [25, 26]. If the model (1) is used Bell-type 
inequalities may not be proven and quantum predictions may be reproduced.  In spite of the fact 
that it has been explained by several authors the speculations about nonlocality of Nature and the 
quantum magic continue.  
Using the model (1) one obtains explicitly local expectation values of single clicks observed 
by Alice             
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 The model (1-3) allows explaining why single counts deduced from the estimated 
correlations between Alice’s and Bob’s may depend on the settings and it does not mean that 
Einsteinian no-signaling is violated [53]. 
Several authors argue, evoking the Bayes theorem, that setting dependent parameters 
compromise   experimenters’ freedom of choice. It has been proven recently in   [52] that such 
conclusion is incorrect.  
Therefore the violation of Bell-type inequalities neither proves the nonlocality of Nature nor 
the completeness of QM.  
In the next section we discuss a general problem whether a probabilistic description of a 
random experiments may be considered complete. We conclude that we still don’t know whether 
QM is predictably complete and that it should be tested. 
4. Can a statistical description of phenomena be considered complete?  
In this section we reproduce again after some editing several paragraphs form [46]. 
A statistical description is not a description of individual objects but it is a description of 
regularities observed in large populations or in the outcomes of a series of repeated random 
experiments. 
 Let us examine a series of coin flipping experiments. Instead of coins having head and tails 
we have coins with one side ”blue”(B) and one side ”red”(R). If we want to provide a complete 
description of a coin using concepts of classical physics and mechanics we may say that a coin is 
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a round disk of a given diameter. We can find also its mass, volume, moment of inertia etc. All 
these attributes (values of classical observables) describe “completely” a coin from a classical 
point of view. We have also at our disposal various flipping devices.  From outside all of them 
look the same: you have a place to put a coin, one of the faces up, and a button to push on. A coin 
is projected and you see it flying, rotating and finally it lands on an observation plate. 
 
 EXPERIMENT 1 (E1). We start with a device D1 and we use only one coin. At first 
we do not pay attention what is a color of a face of the coin which we put up. For 
example we record a series of outcomes: BBRBRRRB... At the first sight it is a time 
series of events without any regularity. We decide now to be more systematic and to 
put always a face B up into the device. To our big satisfaction we obtain a simple 
time series: RRRRRR... If instead we put a face R up into the device we obtain: 
BBBBB.... From an empirical point of view our description of the phenomenon is 
complete. A device D1 is a classical deterministic device such that if we insert into it 
a particular coin it changes a face B up into a face R up and vice versa. However we 
do not see only the final result we see also a coin flying, revolving and landing. If 
you are a physicist you would like to understand why so complicated phenomenon 
gives a simple deterministic result. Let us imagine that we are allowed to examine 
the interior of the device. If we see that D1 gives always to the coin the same initial 
linear velocity and the same initial angular velocity then knowing the laws of 
classical mechanics and taking into consideration air resistance but neglecting the 
influence of the air turbulences, caused by a revolving coin, we can, with a help of a 
computer, reproduce a flight of the coin and deduce that the coin placed with one 
face up will land always on the observation plate with another face up. It would 
provide a complete description of the phenomenon. Even if we were unable to make 
calculations we could anticipate a result and we could say that we understood            
” completely” the studied phenomenon. Of course we took the Newton’s equations 
for granted but in some point looking for the explanation we have to stop asking a 
question: ”Why?” 
 
 EXPERIMENT 2 (E2). We take the same coin and a device D2. On a basis of the 
previous experiment we start by placing the coin always with face B up and we 
preform several series of trials. To our surprise we get a time series of results 
BRBRBRB...or RBRBR...We obtain similar results if we place the face R up. A 
complete empirical explanation of the phenomenon is that D2 produces completely 
deterministic alternating series of outcomes. The only uncertainty is a first result. It 
shows that a device has some memory. For example a flipping mechanism of the D2 
can be identical to the flipping mechanism of the D1 with one difference that the 
inserted coins are rotated around a horizontal axis before being flipped with a 
rotating mechanism keeping a memory of events: each 180◦ rotation is followed by 
360◦ and vice versa. To understand ‘’completely” the phenomenon we examine the 
interior of the device and we repeat the analysis we did for E1.  
 
 EXPERIMENT 3 (E3).  We replace the device D2 by a device D3. We repeat several 
times the experiment with the face B up and after with the face R up. We obtain 
various time series which seem to be completely random. We call a colleague 
statistician for help. He checks that the observed time series is random. He observes 
that relative empirical frequencies of observing the face B in long runs are close to 
0.5. It concludes that each experiment is a Bernoulli trial with a probability p=0.5. 
Using this assumption he can make predictions concerning the number of faces B 
observed in N-repetitions of the experiment and compare them with the data. A 
statistical description of the observed time-series of results is complete and it may be 
resumed in the following rigorous way: Anytime we place the coin into the device 
D3 there are two outcomes possible each obtained with a probability 0.5. A 
probability 0.5 it is not the information about the coin. It is not the information about 
the device D3. It is only the information about the statistical distribution of outcomes 
of random experiments: inserting the coin into the device, pushing the button on 
and registering the outcome. This is why a statement: the coin, if flipped, has a 
probability 0.5 to land with the face B up is incorrect. All devices considered above 
are flipping devices but the statistical distributions of the results they produce are 
different. We could correct this statement by adding: if flipped with the device D3, 
but one has to remember what it means. Once again to understand completely the 
phenomenon we could look in the interior of the device D3 .For example we might 
find that D3 is identical to the device D1 but before flipping there was some 
mechanism rotating the coin in a pseudo random way. It would allow us to 
understand” more completely” the phenomenon but it would not give us any 
additional information about the statistical distribution of results. There could be 
however an advantage of this ”more complete” description of the phenomenon 
 
Let us imagine that to each device considered above we add a ventilator blowing on the coin 
when it is flying. It would certainly modify statistical distribution of results in the experiments E1 
and E2. From the empirical point of view the device D1 with a ventilator it is a new device D’1 so 
we have a new random experiment and a new statistical distribution to be found. However on 
this level we are unable to predict how this new description originates from a previous one. On 
the contrary a knowledge of the ”complete ” description of the phenomenon describing a flight of 
the coin produced by D1 could be used to predict the modifications induced by the wind 
produced by the ventilator. If we had a classical theory describing time evolution of the air 
turbulences and its interactions with the coin (which we don’t have) we could in principle 
determine possible trajectories of the coin and deduce the changes in the statistical distribution of 
experimental outcomes.  
In all these experiments we saw the coin flying and we could look inside the experimental 
devices. If we did not have this knowledge but only the knowledge of final results the only 
unambiguous description would be a statistical one. Probably we could invent infinite number of   
”microscopic” hidden variable models agreeing with observations but we would not gain any 
better understanding of the results.  
This resembles the situation in quantum mechanics. We have a stable source producing 
some beam. We place in front of a beam some detector  which clicks regularly what makes us 
believe that we have a beam of some invisible ”particles” having some constant intensity. We 
take the detector out and we pass our beam by the experimental arrangement (a device) and we 
observe a time– series of the possible final outcomes. QM gives us algorithms to calculate 
probability distributions of outcomes giving no information how a time-series is building up. 
Einstein understood very well the statistical description of the experiments given by QM but he 
believed that this statistical description should be ”completed” by some “microscopic” 
description explaining how the observed time- series of the results is building up.  
It seems to us that if such description existed, it would be extremely complicated and not 
unique so perhaps not very useful. Even if one does not think that such ”microscopic ” 
description is needed a hypothesis, that such description is possible, suggests that there is some 
information in the time- series of the results not accounted for by the statistical description given 
by QM. If it was true a careful analysis of time- series of outcomes could reveal some structure 
not explained by QM what would imply that statistical description provides an incomplete 
statistical description of the data. 
Therefore a question whether a particular statistical description of the phenomenon is 
complete or not, it is an experimental question which can be asked and answered independently 
of the existence of a ”microscopic” description of the phenomenon. The answer can be obtained 
with the help of the purity tests which were proposed many years ago [42, 43] and never done. 
We explain the idea of these tests continuing our discussion of simple experiments with coins.  
As we saw in the experiment E3 any time- series obtained could be interpreted as a series of  
results of consecutive repetitions of  identical Bernoulli trials each characterized completely by a 
probability p = 0.5. Let us consider now another random experiment.  
 
 EXPERIMENT 4 (E4). There is a box containing coins but we do not see what is in 
the box. There are 51 blue coins and 51 red coins in the box .With closed eyes we mix 
well coins, we draw one coin from the box, we place it on a table and finally we 
open eyes and we record the color of a coin without replacing it in the box. We 
continue drawing the coins and when 100 coins are on the table we return all of 
them to the box.  If we repeat this random experiment several times we find that 
,each time,  a frequency of drawing a blue coin is close to 0.5. We are tempted to 
conclude that a probability of drawing a blue coin in each draw is equal to 0.5. The 
probabilistic description of the experiments E4 and E3 seems to be identical. Our 
friend statistician tells us not to jump into conclusion too fast because if initially in 
the box we have 2N coins (N red and N blue) on the average we find 50% of blue 
coins in a sample but a time- series is different and in principle we can discover it by 
a more detailed statistical analysis of this series. In the case of Bernoulli trials at each 
repetition the probability of drawing a blue coin  is the same. On the contrary in E4 
the probability of drawing a blue coin in the k-th draw depends on a number of blue 
coins drawn already. If among  k draws there were m blue coins  then the probability 
of obtaining a blue coin in the next draw is  p(k+1)=p(k+1,m, N)= (N-m)/(2N-k). Thus 
in E4 we have a succession of different dependent random experiments when in the 
E3 we have a succession of identical independent random experiments. The 
averages of two time series are consistent but the time- series are different. In this 
case a statement that a probability of drawing a blue face is in each draw in E4 is 
equal to 0.5 is not only incomplete but it is also incorrect. 
 
 If we modify the experiment E4 namely by returning a coin to the box after each draw our 
new experiment is, for samples of a size smaller than 102, completely equivalent to the 
experiment E3. On the ”microscopic ” level there is however one fundamental difference: in E4 
the coins in the box are always either blue or red when the coin in the experiment E3 is neither 
blue nor red but unfortunately this difference is not seen from the existing data. To see more 
easily how such ”microscopic” differences could be detected by performing additional 
experiments we discuss another macroscopic experiments with coins. 
 
 EXPERIMENT 5 (E5) There is a box, which contains now 50 blue coins and 50 red 
coins having all other physical properties identical. A button is pushed and a 
mechanical arm picks at random one of the coins in a box and inserts it into the 
device D3. The result B or R is recorded and handed to the experimenter and a coin 
is returned to the box.  
 
 EXPERIMENT 6 (E6) The only difference with E5 is that instead of containing 50 red 
and 50 blue coins a box contains 100 two-sided coins identical to the coin used in the 
experiments E1-E3. All other physical properties of two-sided coins are the same as 
the physical properties of the coins in E5. 
 
The experiments E5 and E6 produce finite time-series of results which do not allow to find 
any significant difference between them. Two physicists agree with this statement but they 
cannot agree how to interpret the results. One of them, a follower of Einstein, says: we have a 
statistical mixture (mixed statistical ensemble) in the box of the same number of blue and red 
coins and because we draw the coins from the box with replacement thus on average we observe 
50% of blue coins in each run of the experiment.  
A second physicist, a follower of Bohr, says: it is nonsense we have simply a pure statistical 
ensembles of quantum coins each in the same pure quantum state, such that each of them has 
simply a probability 0.5 to become blue or red after interacting with the measuring device. They 
meet a statistician who confirms that the experiments give indistinguishable results and tell them 
that without performing supplementary experiments one cannot decide whose model is a correct 
one. 
 He tells them that in a mixed statistical ensemble some of it sub-ensembles can in principle 
have different observable statistical properties. On the contrary if one has a pure statistical 
ensemble all of its sub-ensembles have the same properties as the initial ensemble. Our physicists 
agree with the statistician and they make a hole in the boxes containing coins and they decide to 
remove the same number of coins in E5 and in  E6 before proceeding with several repetitions of 
their experiment. If they removed by chance the equal number of blue and red coins in E5 no 
difference could be noticed but if  by chance they changed a proportion of blue coins in their box  
then they could see a difference in long runs of the experiment. If fewer coins were left in the box 
differences could be bigger. For example with 4 blue and 6 red coins in the box the probability of 
outcome B is 0.4 instead of 0.5. With one blue coin in the box they would get p=1. Following the 
same protocol for the experiment E6 they would not register any significant difference in the 
results. After performing these experiments they may confidently conclude that there is a 
”microscopic” difference between E5 and E6. Namely Einstein’s model applies to E5 and Bohr’s 
model may apply to E6.  
Therefore an unproven claim that QM gives a complete description of an individual 
quantum system may not be disproved by any philosophical argument nor by a mathematical 
theorem but it may only be disproved by experimental data. A probabilistic description   of  
experiments performed on an ensemble of identically prepared individual systems can be said to 
describe completely an  interaction of an individual system with the experimental device when a 
statistical ensemble is pure and a time series of data is a simple random sample. 
The assumption of completeness of the statistical description provided by QM is not only 
unnecessary but it is counter- productive. The experimentalists are interested only in testing the 
statistical distributions of experimental results in long runs without even trying to analyze in 
detail observed time-series. They eliminate “bad” experimental runs, sometimes without finding 
any logical reason for doing it, simply because in the theory there is no place for them. We have 
enormous amount of data accumulated. If we performed tests of the randomness and the purity 
tests [43] on these data perhaps we would discover new statistical regularities in the time- series 
we had never thought they existed. Here we stop this edited long citation from [46]. 
We are now in 2018 and still the homogeneity of experimental random samples has not been 
studied carefully enough.  In the meantime new tests which could be used to check whether QM 
is predictably complete were explained [72-74]. We also demonstrated with Hans de Raedt  [75]  
that sample inhomogeneity leads to a dramatic breakdown of the  standard statistical analysis 
and makes statistical significance tests inconclusive. This is why we hope that testing sample 
homogeneity will become one day an essential part of any analysis of experimental data.   
The violation of Bell inequalities confirmed a contextual character of quantum observables. 
Quantum phenomena and the measurement outcomes are produced when physical systems 
interact with various instruments in well-defined experimental contexts.   
QM discovered the existence of incompatible physical observables which are represented by 
non -commuting operators. In order to measure these observables one has to use mutually 
exclusive experimental set-ups and the variances of the statistical distributions of the 
measurement outcomes are related by uncertainty relations. An important couple of such 
observables are the position and the linear momentum another couple is spin-projections in two 
different directions.  
 There is no experimental set-up allowing to measure simultaneously and with arbitrary 
precision the values of these incompatible physical observables on any physical system. A joint 
probability distribution of random variables representing incompatible physical observables does 
not exist thus it cannot be used to reproduce all the predictions of QM for mutually exclusive 
experiments in which the values of these variables are measured. It was confirmed by the 
violation of Bell-type inequalities and by the negativity of the Wigner function.   
There is a big difference between a position of an electron and its spin projection. A 
projection of electron’s spin takes only discrete values and is the effect of the interaction of 
electron’s magnetic moment with the Stern-Gerlach apparatus [52]. An electron is often 
considered to be a “point-like particle” thus by its definition at any moment of time it must be 
somewhere. This unknown position can never be measured with an arbitrary precision and we 
find only a macroscopic ionization track in the bubble chamber or in the emulsion caused by an 
electron’s passage. Electron is not only a mass and a charge but it is surrounded by the 
electromagnetic field.  Therefore one should not forget that the configuration of this field 
depends on how many slits are open in the two slit experiment before saying that an electron is 
passing by two distant slits at the same time.  
According to Copenhagen interpretation a question by which slit electron is passing through 
is meaningless but it does not mean that an electron can be in two distant positions at the same 
time and it appears only in a well localized position if we make a position measurement asking: 
Electron where are you?” This is why we believe as, Einstein did, that the Moon is there even if 
we do not look at it.  
Particle physicists consider electrons, protons and heavy ions as a “real stuff” and prepare 
various beams of them in accelerators (operating according to the laws of classical 
electrodynamics) to study their collisions. They use mathematical algorithms provided by 
quantum electrodynamics and by the Standard Model to “explain” their observations in a 
quantitative way.  It is important to point out that Feynman graphs are only simple pictorial tools 
which allow including all contributions to perturbative calculation of transition amplitudes. By 
no means are they faithful images of real processes taking place in a space- time.   
Similarly trajectories in the path integral formulation of quantum mechanics are only 
mathematical entities which may hardly justify the faith in so called many world interpretation of 
QM which starts to be fashionable again.  
4. Discussion 
We got used to think that our perceptions are some imperfect images of the underlying 
objective physical reality.  Mathematical models of classical physics used mathematical entities 
which were idealizations of our observations and provided the description of the physical reality 
which was consistent with our common sense and with the local causally we have been 
witnessing in our everyday experience.  
To explain invisible world of atoms and elementary particles we succeeded to create 
quantum mechanics, quantum electrodynamics and quantum field theory (QFT) which allowed 
us to provide a quantitative description of many physical phenomena and to predict the existence 
of new phenomena.  Quantum theories use complicated mathematical models and often give 
only probabilistic predictions on a statistical scatter of experimental outcomes. Mathematical 
models do not contain intuitive images and explanations how observed phenomena and 
individual experimental outcomes, registered by macroscopic instruments, are produced.  
 Various scientists add to the abstract quantum description contradictory interpretations and 
explanations. One of the challenges is to arrive to the consensus which of these interpretations is 
correct [69, 76].  Some scientists claim that we have simply to accept quantum magic.  
We believe that there is no person who was not amazed by tricks performed by a 
professional magician. We do not understand how he is doing it but we know that there is a 
causally local explanation of these apparent miracles.  Similarly Einstein strongly believed there 
should be some locally causal explanation of quantum miracles.  
 In this paper we recalled a locally causal explanation of one of these miracles: nonlocal 
correlations between entangled quantum systems. Einstein objected a claim that a statistical 
description of physical phenomena may be considered complete. In this paper we discussed in 
some detail how such claim  may be tested and we pointed out that in fact we don’t even know 
whether QM is predictably complete [43, 72].  
There is another serious problem.  The mathematics is a rigorous theory but often exact 
solutions of mathematical equations cannot be found. This problem we encountered when we 
tried to solve Newton’s equations of motion, Schrodinger equations, interacting quantum field 
equations etc. Thus we had to develop techniques to obtain approximate solutions.  
QFT is unable to describe exactly the scattering of bound states. Therefore semi- empirical 
models containing several adjustable parameters are added to a theory in order to explain 
various phenomena in particle physics. In particular the comparison of the Standard Model with 
experimental data is a difficult task requiring many free parameters, various phenomenological 
inputs and Monte Carlo simulation of events [77, 78].  
All models for high-energy baryon-baryon and heavy ion collisions assume that the Optical 
Theorem is valid [79].  It was clearly demonstrated that one may have a unitary S-matrix without 
the Optical Theorem thus the validity of the Optical Theorem should not be taken for granted 
and should be carefully tested [79-85]. The violation of the Optical Theorem might be easily 
reconciled with the standard model [85]. 
Standard Model faces also serious challenges related to the discovery of black matter, 
massive neutrinos,  teraquarks and pentaquarks. 
There is also another problem: quantum models are very flexible and allow introduction of 
several free parameters in order to explain experimental data. Therefore there is a danger that 
quantum theory becomes unfalsifiable [86].  
Quantum theory led to spectacular technological developments, discovery of new 
constituents of matter and new materials and we may be proud of it.  Quantum-like probabilistic 
models find successful applications in psychology, economy and in other domains of science   
[11, 41]. 
However we should not forget what Bohr said :”The main point to realize is that a 
knowledge presents itself within a conceptual framework adapted to account for previous 
experience and that any such frame may prove too narrow to comprehend new experiences”[5].  
Moreover in QFT we encounter several infinities which are removed by various well 
understood renormalization procedures. The infinities arrive because the fields are defined on a 
continuous space-time and we are dealing with point-like charges and masses. It would be much 
more elegant to construct a theory which does not require any renormalization. This was the 
opinion of Dirac who at the end of his book wrote:” the difficulties being of a profound character 
can be removed only by some drastic change in the foundations of the theory, probably a change 
as drastic as the passage from Bohr’s orbit theory to the present quantum mechanics” [4, 87]. 
Perhaps such drastic change will be needed to reconcile the quantum theory with the 
general relativity and cosmology.  
We mentioned only few open questions and challenges standing before quantum theory. 
When this paper was completed we found that exhaustive discussion of various open questions 
was also given recently by  Allen and Lidstrom [88] , by Coley [89] and by Khrennikov [90]. 
The correct understanding of the foundations of quantum theory is also important for the 
success of the quantum computer program.  
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